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Policy Implications of the
New Keynesian Phillips
Curve
Stephanie Schmitt-Groh´ e and Mart´ ın Uribe
T
he theoretical framework within which optimal monetary policy was
studiedbeforethearrivaloftheNewKeynesianPhillipscurve(NKPC),
but after economists had become comfortable using dynamic, opti-
mizing, general equilibrium models and a welfare-maximizing criterion for
policy analysis, was one in which the central source of nominal nonneutrality
was a demand for money. At center stage in this literature was the role of
money as a medium of exchange (as in cash-in-advance models, money-in-
the-utility-functionmodels,orshopping-timemodels)orasastoreofvalue(as
in overlapping-generations models). In the context of this family of models a
robust prescription for the optimal conduct of monetary policy is to set nomi-
nal interest rates to zero at all times and under all circumstances. This policy
implication, however, found no fertile ground in the boardrooms of central
banks around the world, where the optimality of zero nominal rates was dis-
missed as a theoretical oddity, with little relevance for actual central banking.
Thus, theory and practice of monetary policy were largely disconnected.
The early 1990s witnessed a profound shift in monetary economics away
from viewing the role of money primarily as a medium of exchange and
toward viewing money—sometimes exclusively—as a unit of account. A key
insight was that the mere assumption that product prices are quoted in units
of ﬁat money can give rise to a theory of price level determination, even if
money is physically nonexistent and even if ﬁscal policy is irrelevant for price
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level determination.1 This theoretical development was appealing to those
who regard modern payment systems as operating increasingly cashlessly.
At the same time, nominal rigidities in the form of sluggish adjustment of
product and factor prices gained prominence among academic economists.
Theincorporationofstickypricesintodynamicstochasticgeneralequilibrium
modelsgaverisetoapolicytradeoffbetweenoutputandinﬂationstabilization
that came to be known as the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The inessential role that money balances play in the New Keynesian liter-
ature,alongwiththeobservedactualconductofmonetarypolicyintheUnited
States and elsewhere over the past 30 years, naturally shifted theoretical in-
terest away from money growth rate rules and toward interest rate rules: In
the work of academic monetary economists, Milton Friedman’s celebrated
k-percent growth path for the money supply gave way to Taylor’s equally
inﬂuential interest rate feedback rule.
In this article, we survey recent advancements in the theory of optimal
monetary policy in models with a New Keynesian Phillips curve. Our survey
identiﬁes a number of important lessons for the conduct of monetary policy.
First, optimal monetary policy is characterized by near price stability. This
policyimplicationisdiametricallydifferentfromtheonethatobtainsinmodels
inwhichtheonlynominalfrictionisatransactionsdemandformoney. Second,
simple interest rate feedback rules that respond aggressively to price inﬂation
deliver near-optimal equilibrium allocations. Third, interest rate rules that
respondtodeviationsofoutputfromtrendmaycarrysigniﬁcantwelfarecosts.
Taken together, lessons one through three call for the adherence to an inﬂation
targeting objective. Fourth, the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not
appear to be a signiﬁcant obstacle for the actual implementation of low and
stable inﬂation. Finally, product price stability emerges as the overriding goal
of monetary policy even in environments where not only goods prices but also
factor prices are sticky.
Before elaborating on the policy implications of the NKPC, we provide
some perspective by presenting a brief account of the state of the literature on
optimal monetary policy before the advent of the New Keynesian revolution.
1. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY PRE-NKPC
Within the pre-NKPC framework, under quite general conditions, optimal
monetary policy calls for a zero opportunity cost of holding money, a result
known as the Friedman rule. In ﬁat money economies in which assets used
for transactions purposes do not earn interest, the opportunity cost of holding
money equals the nominal interest rate. Therefore, in the class of models
1 This is the case, for instance, when the monetary stance is active and the ﬁscal stance is
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commonly used for policy analysis before the emergence of the NKPC, the
optimalmonetarypolicyprescribedthattherisklessnominalinterestrate—the
return on federal funds, say—be set at zero at all times.
In the early literature, a demand for money is motivated in a variety of
ways, including a cash-in-advance constraint (Lucas 1982), money in the
utility function (Sidrauski 1967), a shopping-time technology (Kimbrough
1986), or a transactions-cost technology (Feenstra 1986). Regardless of how
a demand for money is introduced, the intuition for why the Friedman rule is
optimal in this class of model is straightforward: A zero nominal interest rate
maximizes holdings of a good—real money balances—that has a negligible
production cost. Another reason why the Friedman rule is optimal is that
a positive interest rate can distort the efﬁcient allocation of resources. For
instance, in the cash-in-advance model with cash and credit goods, a positive
interestratedistortstheallocationofprivatespendingacrossthesetwotypesof
goods. In models in which money ameliorates transaction costs or decreases
shopping time, a positive interest rate introduces a wedge in the consumption-
leisure choice.
ToillustratetheoptimalityoftheFriedmanrule,weaugmentaneoclassical
model with a transaction technology that is decreasing in real money holdings
and increasing in consumption spending. Speciﬁcally, consider an economy
populated by a large number of identical households. Each household has
preferences deﬁned over processes of consumption and leisure and described





where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes labor effort, β ∈ (0,1) denotes
the subjective discount factor, and E0 denotes the mathematical expectation
operator conditional on information available in period 0. The single period
utility function, U, is assumed to be increasing in consumption, decreasing in
effort, and strictly concave.
Final goods are produced using a production function, ztF(h t), that takes
labor, ht, as the only factor input and is subject to an exogenous productivity
shock, zt.
A demand for real balances is introduced into the model by assuming
that money holdings, denoted Mt, facilitate consumption purchases. Specif-
ically, consumption purchases are subject to a proportional transaction cost,






where Pt denotes the nominal price of the consumption good in period t. The
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is nonnegative and twice continuously differentiable; (b) there exists a level
of velocity, v > 0, to which we refer as the satiation level of money, such
that s(v) = s (v) = 0; (c) (v − v)s (v) > 0 for v  = v; and (d) 2s (v) +
vs  (v) > 0 for all v ≥ v. Assumption (b) ensures that the Friedman rule (i.e.,
a zero nominal interest rate) need not be associated with an inﬁnite demand
for money. It also implies that both the transaction cost and the distortion
it introduces vanish when the nominal interest rate is zero. Assumption (c)
guarantees that in equilibrium money velocity is always greater than or equal
to the satiation level. Assumption (d) ensures that the demand for money is
decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Households are assumed have access to risk-free pure discount bonds,
denoted Bt. These bonds are assumed to carry a gross nominal interest rate
of Rt when held from period t to period t + 1. The ﬂow budget constraint of
the household in period t is then given by
Ptct[1 + s(vt)] + PtτL
t + Mt +
Bt
Rt
= Mt−1 + Bt−1 + PtztF(h t), (3)
where τL
t denotes real lump sum taxes. In addition, it is assumed that the
household is subject to a borrowing limit that prevents it from engaging in
Ponzi-type schemes. The government is assumed to follow a ﬁscal policy
whereby it rebates any seigniorage income it receives from the creation of
money in a lump sum fashion to households.
Astationarycompetitiveequilibriumcanbeshowntobeasetofplans{ct,
ht, vt}, satisfying the following three conditions:
v2









1 + s(vt) + vts (vt)
, and (5)
[1 + s(vt)]ct = ztF(h t), (6)
given monetary policy {Rt}, with Rt ≥ 1, and the exogenous process {zt}.
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition can be interpreted as a demand for money
or liquidity preference function. Given our maintained assumptions about
the transactions technology, s(vt), the implied money demand function is
decreasing in the gross nominal interest rate, Rt. Further, our assumptions
imply that as the interest rate vanishes, or Rt approaches unity, the demand
for money reaches a ﬁnite maximum level given by ct/v. At this level of
money demand, households are able to perform transactions costlessly, as the
transactionscost,s(vt),becomesnil. Thesecondequilibriumconditionshows
that a level of money velocity above the satiation level, v, or, equivalently, an
interestrategreaterthanzero,introducesawedgebetweenthemarginalrateof
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wedge, given by 1+s(vt)+vts (vt), induces households to move away from
consumption and toward leisure. The wedge is increasing in the nominal
interest rate, implying that the larger is the nominal interest rate, the more
distorted is the consumption-leisure choice. The ﬁnal equilibrium condition
statesthatapositiveinterestrateentailsaresourcelossintheamountofs(vt)ct.
This resource loss is increasing in the interest rate and vanishes only when the
nominal interest rate equals zero.
We wish to characterize optimal monetary policy under the assumption
that the government has the ability to commit to policy announcements. This
policy optimality concept is known as Ramsey optimality. In the context of
the present model, the Ramsey optimal monetary policy consists in choosing
the path of the nominal interest rate that is associated with the competitive
equilibrium that yields the highest level of welfare to households. Formally,
theRamseypolicyconsistsinchoosingprocessesRt,ct,ht,andvt tomaximize
thehousehold’sutilityfunctiongiveninequation(1)subjecttothecompetitive
equilibrium conditions given by equations (4) through (6).
Whenoneinspectsthethreeequilibriumconditionsabove,itisclearthatif
the policymaker sets the monetary policy instrument, which we take to be the
nominal interest rate, such that velocity is at the satiation level, (vt = v), then
theequilibriumconditionsbecomeidenticaltoaneconomywithoutthemoney
demand friction, i.e., ct = ztF(h t) and −Uh(ct,h t)/Uc(ct,h t) = ztF  (ht).
Because the real allocation in the absence of the monetary friction is Pareto
optimal, the proposed monetary policy must be Ramsey optimal. By a Pareto
optimal allocation we mean a feasible real allocation (i.e., one satisfying ct =
ztF[ht])withthepropertythatanyotherfeasibleallocationthatmakesatleast
one agent better off also makes at least one agent worse off. It follows from
equation (4) that setting the nominal interest rate to zero (Rt = 1) ensures
that vt = v. For this reason, optimal monetary policy takes the form of a zero
nominal interest rate at all times.
Under the optimal monetary policy, the rate of change in the aggregate
price level varies over time. Because, to a ﬁrst approximation, the nominal
interest rate equals the sum of the real interest rate and the expected rate of
inﬂation, and because under the optimal monetary policy the nominal interest
rate is held constant, the degree to which the inﬂation rate ﬂuctuates depends
on the equilibrium variations in the real rate of interest. In general, opti-
mal monetary policy in a model in which a role for monetary policy arises
solely from the presence of money demand is not characterized by inﬂation
stabilization.
Asecondimportantconsequenceofoptimalmonetarypolicyinthecontext
of the present model is that inﬂation is, on average, negative. This is because,
with a zero nominal interest rate, the inﬂation rate equals, on average, the
negative of the real rate of interest.440 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. THE NKPCAND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
The New Keynesian Phillips curve can be brieﬂy deﬁned as the dynamic
output-inﬂation tradeoff that arises in a dynamic general equilibrium model
populated by utility-maximizing households and proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms—
such as the one laid out in the previous section—and augmented with some
kind of rigidity in the adjustment of nominal product prices. The foundations
of the NKPC were laid by Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982). Woodford
(1996) andYun (1996) completed its development by introducing optimizing
behavior on the part of ﬁrms facing Calvo-type dynamic nominal rigidities.
The most important policy implication of models featuring a New
Keynesian Phillips curve is the optimality of price stability (see Goodfriend
and King [1997] for an early presentation of this result). We will discuss
the price stability result in a variety of theoretical models, including ones
with a realistic set of real and nominal rigidities, policy instruments and pol-
icy constraints, and sources of aggregate ﬂuctuations. We start, however,
with the simplest structure within which the price stability result can be ob-
tained. To this end, we strip the model presented in the previous section from
its money demand friction and instead introduce costs of adjusting nominal
product prices. In the resulting model, sticky prices represent the sole source
of nominal friction.
To introduce sticky prices into the model of the previous section, assume
that the consumption good, ct, is a composite good made of a continuum of
intermediate differentiated goods. The aggregator function is of the Dixit-
Stiglitz type. Each household/ﬁrm unit is the monopolistic producer of one
variety of intermediate goods. In turn, intermediate goods are produced using
a technology like the one given in the previous section. The household/ﬁrm
unit hires labor, ˜ ht, from a perfectly competitive market.
The demand faced by the household/ﬁrm unit for the intermediate in-
put that it produces is of the form Ytd( ˜ Pt/Pt), where Yt denotes the level
of aggregate demand, which is taken as exogenous by the household/ﬁrm
unit; ˜ Pt denotes the nominal price of the intermediate good produced by the
household/ﬁrm unit; and Pt is the price of the composite consumption good.
The demand function, d(·), is assumed to be decreasing in the relative price,
˜ Pt/Pt, and is assumed to satisfy d(1) = 1 and −d (1) ≡ η>1, where η
denotes the price elasticity of demand for each individual variety of interme-
diate goods that prevails in a symmetric equilibrium. The restrictions on d(1)
and d (1) are necessary for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium. The
monopolist sets the price of the good it supplies, taking the level of aggregate
demand as given, and is constrained to satisfy demand at that price, that is,
ztF(˜ ht) ≥ Ytd( ˜ Pt/Pt).
Priceadjustmentisassumedtobesluggish, ` alaRotemberg(1982). Specif-
ically, the household/ﬁrm unit faces a resource cost of changing prices that isS. Schmitt-Groh´ e and M. Uribe: Policy Implications of the NKPC 441
quadratic in the inﬂation rate of the good it produces:









The parameter θ measures the degree of price stickiness. The higher is θ,
the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. When θ equals zero,
prices are fully ﬂexible. The ﬂow budget constraint of the household/ﬁrm unit
in period t is then given by
ct + τL





















t denotes an income tax/subsidy rate. We introduce this ﬁscal instru-
ment as a way to offset the distortions arising from the presence of monopo-
listic competition. We restrict attention to a stationary symmetric equilibrium
in which all household/ﬁrm units charge the same price for the intermediate
good they produce. Letting πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denote the gross rate of inﬂation,
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(πt − 1)2 = ct. (10)
The above three equations provide solutions for the equilibrium processes of
consumption, ct, hours, ht, and the real wage, wt, given processes for the rate
of inﬂation, πt, and for the tax rate, τD
t , which we interpret to be outcomes of
the monetary and ﬁscal policies in place, respectively.
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition, equation (8), represents the NKPC, to
which the current volume is devoted. It describes an equilibrium relation-
ship between current inﬂation, πt, the current deviation of marginal cost,
wt/ztF  (ht), from marginal revenue, (η−1)/η, and expected future inﬂation.
Under full price ﬂexibility, the ﬁrm would always set marginal revenue equal
to marginal cost. However, in the presence of price adjustment costs, this
practice is costly. To smooth out price changes over time, ﬁrms set prices to
equate an average of current and future expected marginal costs to an average
of current and future expected marginal revenues. This optimal price-setting
behavior gives rise to a relation whereby, given expected inﬂation, current in-
ﬂation is an increasing function of marginal costs. Intuitively, this relation is
steeper the more ﬂexible are prices (i.e., the lower is θ), the more competitive442 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
are product markets (i.e., the higher is η), and the higher is the current level
of demand (i.e., the larger is ct). At the same time, given marginal cost, cur-
rent inﬂation is increasing in expected future inﬂation. This is because, with
quadratic costs of changing nominal prices, a ﬁrm expecting higher inﬂation
in the future would like to smooth out the necessary price adjustments over
time by beginning to raise prices already in the current period.
We have derived the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the context of the
Rotemberg (1982) model of price stickiness. However, a similar relation-
ship emerges under other models of nominal rigidity, such as those due to
Calvo (1983),Taylor (1993),Woodford (1996), andYun (1996). For instance,
in the Calvo-Woodford-Yun model, price stickiness arises because ﬁrms are
assumed to receive an idiosyncratic random signal each period indicating
whether they are allowed to reoptimize their posted prices. A difference be-
tween the Rotemberg and the Calvo-Woodford-Yun models is that the latter
displays equilibrium price dispersion across ﬁrms even in the absence of ag-
gregate uncertainty. However, up to ﬁrst order, the NKPCs implied by the
Rotemberg and Calvo-Woodford-Yun models are identical. Indeed, much of
the literature on the NKPC focuses on a log-linear approximation of this key
relationship, as in equation (11).
The second equilibrium condition presented in equation (9) states that
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure is equated to the
after-tax real wage rate. The third equilibrium condition, equation (10), is
a resource constraint requiring that aggregate output net of price adjustment
costs equal private consumption.
It is straightforward to establish that, in this economy, the optimal mone-
tary policy, that is, the policy that maximizes the welfare of the representative
household, is one in which the inﬂation rate is nil at all times. Formally, the
optimal monetary policy must be consistent with an equilibrium in which
πt = 1
for all t ≥ 0. This result holds exactly provided the ﬁscal authority sub-
sidizes labor income to a point that fully offsets the distortion arising from
the existence of imperfect competition among intermediate goods producers.
Speciﬁcally, the income tax rate, τD






for all t ≥ 0.
To see that the proposed policy regime is optimal, we demonstrate that it
implies a set of equilibrium conditions that coincide with the one that arises
in an economy with fully ﬂexible prices (θ = 0) and perfect competition in
productmarkets(η =∞ ),suchastheoneanalyzedinSection1intheabsence
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condition (10) collapses to ct = ztF(h t). In addition, under zero inﬂation
the NKPC (equation [8]) reduces to wt = ztF  (ht)(η − 1)/η. Using this
expression along with the proposed optimal level for the income tax rate in
the equilibrium labor supply, equation (9), yields the efﬁciency conditions
−Uh(ct,h t)/Uc(ct,h t) = ztF  (ht), which, together with the resource con-
straint ct = ztF(h t), constitute the equilibrium conditions of a perfectly
competitive ﬂexible-price economy. As we show in Section 1, the resource
allocation in this economy is Pareto optimal.
3. THE OPTIMAL INFLATION RATE
At this point, it is of interest to summarize and compare the results in this
section and in previous ones. We have shown that when prices are fully
ﬂexible and the only nominal friction is a demand for money, then optimal
monetary policy takes the form of complete stabilization of the interest rate at
a value of zero (Rt = 1 for all t). We have also established that in a cashless
economy in which the only source of nominal friction is given by product
price stickiness, optimal monetary policy calls for full stabilization of the rate
of inﬂation at a value of zero (πt = 1 for all t). Under optimal policy in the
monetary ﬂexible-price economy, inﬂation is time varying and equal to the
negative of the real interest rate on average, whereas in the cashless sticky-
price economy, inﬂation is constant and equal to zero at all times. Also, in the
monetary ﬂexible-price economy, optimal policy calls for a constant nominal
interest rate equal to zero at all times, whereas in the cashless sticky-price
economy, it calls for a time-varying nominal interest rate equal to the real
interest rate on average.
These results raise the question of what the characteristics of optimal
monetary policy are in a more realistic economic environment in which both
a demand for money and price stickiness coexist. In particular, in such an
environment a policy tradeoff emerges between the beneﬁts of targeting zero
inﬂation—i.e., minimizingprice-adjustmentcosts—andthebeneﬁtsofdeﬂat-
ingattherealrateofinterest—i.e.,minimizingtheopportunitycostofholding
money. In the canonical economies with only one nominal friction studied in
this and previous sections, the characterization of the optimal rate of inﬂation
is relatively straightforward. As soon as both nominal frictions are incorpo-
rated jointly, it becomes impossible to determine the optimal rate of inﬂation
analytically. One is therefore forced to resort to numerical methods.




zero and the one called for by the Friedman rule. The question of interest,
however, is where exactly in this interval the optimal inﬂation rate lies. Khan,444 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
King, andWolman ﬁnd, in the context of a stylized model calibrated to match
aspects of money demand and price dynamics in the postwar United States,
that the optimal rate of inﬂation is −0.76 percent per year. By comparison, in
theirmodeltheFriedmanruleisassociatedwithadeﬂationrateof2.93percent
per year. Thus, in the study by Khan, King, and Wolman, the optimal policy
is closer to price stability than to the Friedman rule. Taking these numbers at
face value, one might conclude that price stickiness is the dominant friction
in shaping optimal monetary policy. However, Khan, King, and Wolman
(2003) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a, 2007b) show that the resolution
of the tradeoff is quite sensitive to plausible changes in the values taken by
the structural parameters of the model.
In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b), we ﬁnd that a striking character-
istic of the optimal monetary regime is the high sensitivity of the welfare-
maximizing rate of inﬂation with respect to the parameter governing the
degree of price stickiness for the range of values of this parameter that is
empirically relevant. The model underlying the analysis of Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2007b) is a medium-scale model of the U.S. economy featuring, in
addition to money demand by households and sticky product prices, a number
of real and nominal rigidities including wage stickiness, a demand for money
by ﬁrms, habit formation, capital accumulation, variable capacity utilization,
and investment adjustment costs. The structural parameters of the model are
assigned values that are consistent with full- as well as limited-information
approaches to estimating this particular model.
In the Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b) model, the degree of price stick-
iness is captured by a parameter denoted α, measuring the probability that a
ﬁrm is not able to optimally set the price it charges in a particular quarter. The
averagenumberofperiodselapsedbetweentwoconsecutiveoptimalpricead-
justments is given by 1/(1 − α). Available empirical estimates of the degree
of price rigidity using macroeconomic data vary from two to ﬁve quarters, or
α ∈ [0.5,0.8]. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) esti-
mate α to be 0.6. By contrast,Altig et al. (2005) estimate a marginal-cost-gap
coefﬁcient in the Phillips curve that is consistent with a value of α of around
0.8. Both Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005)
use an impulse-response matching technique to estimate the price-stickiness
parameter α. Bayesian estimates of this parameter include Del Negro et al.
(2004), Levin et al. (2006), and Smets and Wouters (2007), who report pos-
terior means of 0.67, 0.83, and 0.66, respectively, and 90 percent posterior
probability intervals of (0.51,0.83), (0.81,0.86), and (0.56,0.74), respectively.
Recentempiricalstudieshavedocumentedthefrequencyofpricechanges
usingmicrodataunderlyingtheconstructionoftheU.S.consumerpriceindex.
These studies differ in the sample period considered, in the disaggregation
of the price data, and in the treatment of sales and stockouts. The median
frequency of price changes reported by Bils and Klenow (2004) is four to ﬁveS. Schmitt-Groh´ e and M. Uribe: Policy Implications of the NKPC 445

















Notes: CEE and ACEL indicate, respectively, the values for the parameter, α, estimated
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2005).
months, the one reported by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) is four to seven
months, and the one reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) is eight to
11 months. However, there is no immediate interpretation of these frequency
estimatestotheparameter,α,governingthedegreeofpricestickinessinCalvo-
stylemodelsofpricestaggering. Consider,forinstance,thecaseofindexation.
In that case, even though ﬁrms change prices every period—implying the
highestpossiblefrequencyofpricechanges—pricesthemselvesmaybehighly
sticky, for they may be only reoptimized at much lower frequencies.
Figure 1 displays with a solid line the relationship between the degree of
price stickiness, α, and the optimal rate of inﬂation in percent per year, π,
implied by the model studied in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b). When α
equals 0.5, the lower range of the available empirical evidence using macro-
data, the optimal rate of inﬂation is −2.9 percent, which is the level called
for by the Friedman rule. For a value of α of 0.8, which is near the upper
range of the available empirical evidence using macrodata, the optimal level
of inﬂation rises to −0.4 percent, which is close to price stability.446 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Besides the uncertainty surrounding the estimation of the degree of price
stickiness,asecondaspectoftheapparentdifﬁcultyinestablishingreliablythe
optimal long-run level of inﬂation has to do with the shape of the relationship
linking the degree of price stickiness to the optimal level of inﬂation. The
problem resides in the fact that, as is evident from Figure 1, this relationship
becomes signiﬁcantly steep precisely for that range of values of α that is
empiricallymostcompelling. Itturnsoutthatanimportantfactordetermining
the shape of the function relating the optimal level of inﬂation to the degree
of price stickiness is the underlying ﬁscal policy regime.
Fiscalconsiderationsfundamentallychangethelong-runtradeoffbetween
pricestabilityandtheFriedmanrule. Toseethis,wenowconsideraneconomy
where lump-sum taxes are unavailable (τL = 0). Instead, the ﬁscal author-
ity must ﬁnance government purchases by means of proportional capital and
labor income taxes. The social planner jointly sets monetary and ﬁscal policy
in a welfare-maximizing (i.e., Ramsey-optimal) fashion.2 Figure 1 displays
the relationship between the degree of price stickiness, α, and the optimal
rate of inﬂation, π. The solid line corresponds to the case discussed earlier
featuring lump-sum taxes. The dash-circled line corresponds to the economy
with optimally chosen distortionary income taxes. In stark contrast to what
happens under lump-sum taxation, under optimal distortionary taxation the
function linking π and α is ﬂat and very close to zero for the entire range of
macrodata-basedempiricallyplausiblevaluesofα,namely0.5to0.8. Inother
words, when taxes are distortionary and optimally determined, price stability
emerges as a prediction that is robust to the existing uncertainty about the
exact degree of price stickiness. Even if one focuses on the evidence of price
stickiness stemming from microdata, the model with distortionary Ramsey
taxation predicts an optimal long-run level of inﬂation that is much closer to
zero than to the level called for by the Friedman rule.
Ourintuitionforwhypricestabilityarisesasarobustpolicyrecommenda-
tion in the economy with optimally set distortionary taxation runs as follows.
Consider the economy with lump-sum taxation. Deviating from the Friedman
rule (by raising the inﬂation rate) has the beneﬁt of reducing price adjustment
costs. Consider next the economy with optimally chosen income taxation and
no lump-sum taxes. In this economy, deviating from the Friedman rule still
providesthebeneﬁtofreducingpriceadjustmentcosts. However,inthisecon-
omy, increasing inﬂation has the additional beneﬁt of increasing seigniorage
revenue, therebyallowingthesocialplannertolowerdistortionaryincometax
rates. Therefore, the Friedman rule versus price stability tradeoff is tilted in
favor of price stability.
2 The details of this environment are contained in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006). The
structure of this economy is identical to that studied in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b), except
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It follows from this intuition that what is essential in inducing the opti-
malityofpricestabilityisthat, onthemargin, theﬁscalauthoritytradesoffthe
inﬂation tax for regular taxation. Indeed, it can be shown that if distortionary
tax rates are ﬁxed, even if they are ﬁxed at the level that is optimal in a world
withoutlump-sumtaxes, andtheﬁscalauthorityhasaccesstolump-sumtaxes
onthemargin, theoptimalrateofinﬂationismuchclosertotheFriedmanrule
than to zero. In this case, increasing inﬂation no longer has the beneﬁt of re-
ducingdistortionarytaxes. Asaresult, theRamseyplannerhaslessincentives
to inﬂate.
We close this section by drawing attention to the fact that, quite indepen-
dently of the precise degree of price stickiness, the optimal inﬂation target
is below zero. In light of this robust result, it is puzzling that all countries
that self-classify as inﬂation targeters set inﬂation targets that are positive. In
effect, in the developed world inﬂation targets range between 2 and 4 percent
per year. Somewhat higher targets are observed across developing countries.
An argument often raised in defense of positive inﬂation targets is that neg-
ative inﬂation targets imply nominal interest rates that are dangerously close
to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and, hence, may impair the
central bank’s ability to conduct stabilization policy. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2007b) we ﬁnd, however, that this argument is of little relevance in the
contextofthemedium-scaleestimatedmodelwithinwhichweconductpolicy
evaluation. The reason is that under the optimal policy regime, the mean of
the nominal interest rate is about 4.5 percent per year with a standard devi-
ation of only 0.4 percent. This means that for the zero lower bound to pose
an obstacle to monetary stabilization policy, the economy must suffer from
an adverse shock that forces the interest rate to be more than ten standard
deviations below target. The likelihood of such an event is practically nil.
4. THE OPTIMAL VOLATILITY OF INFLATION
Two distinct branches of the existing literature on optimal monetary policy
deliver diametrically opposed policy recommendations concerning the cycli-
cal behavior of prices and interest rates. One branch follows the theoretical
frameworklaidoutinLucasandStokey(1983). Itstudiesthejointdetermina-
tion of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in ﬂexible-price environments with
perfect competition in product and factor markets. In this strand of the litera-
ture, the government’s problem consists of ﬁnancing an exogenous stream of
public spending by choosing the least disruptive combination of inﬂation and
distortionary income taxes.
CalvoandGuidotti(1990, 1993)andChari, Christiano, andKehoe(1991)
characterize optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in stochastic environments
withnominalnonstate-contingentgovernmentliabilities. Akeyresultofthese
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volatile and serially uncorrelated. For instance, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2004b) show, in the context of a ﬂexible-price model calibrated to the U.S.
economy, that under the optimal policy the inﬂation rate has a standard devi-
ation of 7 percent per year and a serial correlation of −0.03. The intuition for
this result is that, under ﬂexible prices, highly volatile and unforecastable in-
ﬂation is nondistorting and at the same time carries the ﬁscal beneﬁt of acting
as a lump-sum tax on private holdings of government-issued nominal assets.
The government is able to use surprise inﬂation as a nondistorting tax to the
extent that it has nominal, nonstate-contingent liabilities outstanding. Thus,
price changes play the role of a shock absorber of unexpected innovations in
theﬁscaldeﬁcit. This“front-loading”ofgovernmentrevenuesviainﬂationary
shocks allows the ﬁscal authority to keep income tax rates remarkably stable
over the business cycle.
However, as discussed in Section 2, the New Keynesian literature, aside
from emphasizing the role of price rigidities and market power, differs from
the earlier literature described above in two important ways. First, it assumes,
either explicitly or implicitly, that the government has access to (endogenous)
lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance its budget. An important implication of this as-
sumption is that there is no need to use unanticipated inﬂation as a lump-sum
tax; regular lump-sum taxes take on this role. Second, the government is
assumed to be able to implement a production (or employment) subsidy to
eliminate the distortion introduced by the presence of monopoly power in
product and factor markets.
The key result of the New Keynesian literature, which we presented in
Sections 2 and 3, is that the optimal monetary policy features an inﬂation
rate that is zero or close to zero at all times (i.e., both the optimal mean and
volatility of inﬂation are near zero). The reason price stability is optimal in
environments of the type described there is that it minimizes (or completely
eliminates) the costs introduced by inﬂation under nominal rigidities.
Together, these two strands of research on optimal monetary policy leave
the monetary authority without a clear policy recommendation. Should the
central bank pursue policies that imply high or low inﬂation volatility? In
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a), we analyze the resolution of this policy
dilemma by incorporating in a uniﬁed framework the essential elements of
the two approaches to optimal policy described above. Speciﬁcally, we build
a model that shares two elements with the earlier literature: (a) The only
source of regular taxation available to the government is distortionary income
taxes. As a result, the government cannot implement production subsidies
to undo distortions created by the presence of imperfect competition, and (b)
the government issues only nominal, one-period, nonstate-contingent bonds.
At the same time, the setup shares two important assumptions with the more
recent body of work on optimal monetary policy: (a) Product markets are
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hence, the model features a New Keynesian Phillips curve. Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2004a) introduce price stickiness as in the previous section by
assuming that ﬁrms face a convex cost of price adjustment (Rotemberg 1982).
In this environment, the government faces a tradeoff in choosing the path
of inﬂation. On the one hand, the government would like to use unexpected
inﬂation as a nondistorting tax on nominal wealth. In this way, the ﬁscal
authority could minimize variations in distortionary income taxes over the
business cycle. On the other hand, changes in the rate of inﬂation come at a
cost, for ﬁrms face nominal rigidities.
When price changes are brought about at a cost, it is natural to expect
that a benevolent government will try to implement policies consistent with a
morestablebehaviorofpricesthanwhenpricechangesarecostless. However,
the quantitative effect of an empirically plausible degree of price rigidity on
optimal inﬂation volatility is not clear a priori. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2004a), we show that for the degree of price stickiness estimated for the U.S.
economy, this tradeoff is overwhelmingly resolved in favor of price stability.
The Ramsey allocation features a dramatic drop in the standard deviation of
inﬂation from 7 percent per year under ﬂexible prices to a mere 0.17 percent
per year when prices adjust sluggishly.3
Indeed, the impact of price stickiness on the optimal degree of inﬂation
volatilityturnsouttobemuchstrongerthansuggestedbythenumericalresults
reported in the previous paragraph. Figure 2, taken from Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2004a), shows that a minimum amount of price stickiness sufﬁces to
make price stability the central goal of optimal policy. Speciﬁcally, when the
degree of price stickiness, embodied in the parameter θ (see equation [7]), is
assumedtobetentimessmallerthantheestimatedvaluefortheU.S.economy,
the optimal volatility of inﬂation is below 0.52 percent per year, 13 times
smaller than under full price ﬂexibility.
A natural question elicited by Figure 2 is why even a modest degree of
price stickiness can turn undesirable the use of a seemingly powerful ﬁscal
instrument, such as large revaluations or devaluations of private real ﬁnancial
wealth through surprise inﬂation. Our conjecture is that in the ﬂexible-price
economy, the welfare gains of surprise inﬂations or deﬂations are very small.
Our intuition is as follows. Under ﬂexible prices, it is optimal for the central
bank to keep the nominal interest rate constant over the business cycle. This
means that large surprise inﬂations must be as likely as large deﬂations, as
variations in real interest rates are small. In other words, inﬂation must have a
near-i.i.d. behavior. As a result, high inﬂation volatility cannot be used by the
Ramsey planner to reduce the average amount of resources to be collected via
distortionary income taxes, which would be a ﬁrst-order effect. The volatility
3 This price stability result is robust to augmenting the model to allow for nominal rigidities
in wages and indexation in product or factor prices (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe 2006, Table 6.5).450 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: The parameter, θ, governs the cost of adjusting nominal prices as deﬁned in
equation (7). Its baseline value is 4.4, in line with available empirical estimates. The
standard deviation of inﬂation is measured in percent per year.
of inﬂation primarily serves the purpose of smoothing the process of income
tax distortions—a second-order source of welfare losses—without affecting
their average level.
Another way to gain intuition for the dramatic decline in optimal
inﬂation volatility that occurs even at very modest levels of price stickiness
is to interpret price volatility as a way for the government to introduce real
state-contingentpublicdebt. Underﬂexibleprices,thegovernmentusesstate-
contingentchangesinthepricelevelasanondistortingtaxortransferonprivate
holdings of government assets. In this way, nonstate-contingent nominal pub-
lic debt becomes state-contingent in real terms. So, for example, in response
to an unexpected increase in government spending, the Ramsey planner does
not need to increase tax rates by much because by inﬂating away part of the
public debt he can ensure intertemporal budget balance. It is, therefore, clear
that introducing costly price adjustment is the same as if the government were
limitedinitsabilitytoissuerealstate-contingentdebt. Itfollowsthatthelarger
the welfare gain associated with the ability to issue real state-contingent pub-
lic debt—as opposed to nonstate-contingent debt—the larger the amount of
price stickiness required to reduce the optimal degree of inﬂation volatility.
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policy in an economy without real state-contingent public debt is virtually the
same as in an economy with state-contingent debt. Our ﬁnding that a small
amount of price stickiness is all it takes to bring the optimal volatility of in-
ﬂation from a very high level to near zero is thus perfectly in line with the
ﬁnding ofAiyagari et al. (2002).
If this intuition is correct, then the behavior of tax rates and public debt
under sticky prices should resemble that implied by the Ramsey allocation in
economieswithoutrealstate-contingentdebt. Indeed,inﬁnancingthebudget,
the Ramsey planner replaces front-loading with standard debt and tax instru-
ments. For example, in response to an unexpected increase in government
spending, the planner does not generate a surprise increase in the price level.
Instead, he chooses to ﬁnance the increase in government purchases partly
through an increase in income tax rates and partly through an increase in pub-
lic debt. The planner minimizes the tax distortion by spreading the required
tax increase over many periods. This tax-smoothing behavior induces near-
random walk dynamics into the tax rate and public debt. By contrast, under
fullpriceﬂexibility(i.e.,whenthegovernmentcancreatereal-state-contingent
debt), tax rates and public debt inherit the stochastic process of the underlying
shocks.
An important conclusion of this analysis is, thus, that the Aiyagari et al.
(2002) result, namely, that optimal policy imposes a near-random walk be-
havior on taxes and debt, does not require the unrealistic assumption that the
government can issue only nonstate-contingent real debt. This result emerges
naturally in economies with nominally nonstate-contingent debt—clearly the
case of greatest empirical relevance—and a minimum amount of price rigid-
ity.4 However, if government debt is assumed to be state contingent, the
presence of sticky prices may introduce no difference in the Ramsey real allo-
cation, depending on the precise speciﬁcation of the demand for money (see
Correia, Nicolini, and Teles 2008). The reason for this result is that, as shown
in Lucas and Stokey (1983), if government debt is state-contingent and prices
are fully ﬂexible, the Ramsey allocation does not pin down the price level
uniquely. In this case, there is an inﬁnite number of price-level processes (and
thus of money supply processes) that can be supported as Ramsey outcomes.
4 It is of interest to relate the near-random walk in taxes and debt that emerges as the optimal
policy outcome in a model featuring a New Keynesian Phillips curve with the celebrated tax-
smoothing result of Barro (1979). In Barro’s formulation, the objective function of the government
is the expected present discounted value of squared deviations of tax rates from a target or desired
level. The government minimizes this objective function subject to a sequential budget constraint,
which is linear in debt and tax rates. The resulting solution resembles the random walk model of
consumption with taxes taking the place of consumption and public debt taking the place of private
debt. The analysis in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a) departs from Barro’s ad hoc loss function
and replaces it with the utility function of the representative optimizing household inhabiting a
fully-articulated, dynamic, stochastic, general-equilibrium economy. In this environment, the random
walk result obtains from a more subtle channel, namely, the introduction of a miniscule amount
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Looselyspeaking,theintroductionofpricestickinesssimply“usesthisdegree
of freedom” to pin down the equilibrium process of the price level without
altering other aspects of the Ramsey solution.
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIMAL POLICY
We established that in the simple New Keynesian model presented in Section
2, the optimal policy consists of setting the inﬂation rate equal to zero at all
times (πt = 1) and imposing a constant output subsidy (τD
t = 1/[1 − η]).
Thequestionwepursueinthissectionishowtoimplementtheoptimalpolicy.
Because central banks in the United States and elsewhere use the short-term
nominal interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, it is of empirical
interest to search for interest rate rules that implement the optimal allocation.
Using the Ramsey-Optimal Interest Rate Process as a
Feedback Rule
One might be tempted to believe that implementation of optimal policy is
trivial once the interest rate associated with the Ramsey equilibrium has been
found. Speciﬁcally, in the Ramsey equilibrium, the nominal interest rate can
be expressed as a function of the current state of the economy. Then, the
prescription would be simply to use this function as a policy rule in setting
the nominal interest rate at all dates and under all circumstances. It turns
out that conducting policy in this fashion would, in general, not deliver the
intendedresults. Thereasonisthatalthoughsuchapolicywouldbeconsistent
with the optimal equilibrium, it would at the same time open the door to
other (suboptimal) equilibria. It follows that the solution to the optimal policy
problemismutewithrespecttotheissueofimplementationofsuchpolicy. To
see this, it is convenient to consider as an example a log-linear approximation
to the equilibrium conditions associated with the cashless, sticky-price model
presented in Section 2. It can be shown that the resulting linear system is
given by5
ˆ πt = βEt ˆ πt+1 + κˆ ct − γ ˆ zt (11)
and
−σ ˆ ct = ˆ Rt − σEt ˆ ct+1 − Et ˆ πt+1, (12)
where σ,κ,and γ>0 are parameters. Hatted variables denote percent devi-
ations of the corresponding nonhatted variables from their respective values
5 The log-linearization is performed around the nonstochastic steady state of the Ramsey equi-
librium. In performing the linearization, we assume that the period utility function is separable in
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in the deterministic steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. Equation (11)
results from combining equations (8), (9), and (10) and is typically referred to
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve.6 Equation (12) is a linearized version
of an Euler equation that prices nominally risk-free bonds, where Rt denotes
the gross nominal risk-free interest rate between periods t and t + 1. This
equation is typically referred to as the intertemporal IS equation.
Substituting the welfare-maximizing rate of inﬂation, ˆ πt = 0, into the
intertemporal IS curve (12) implies that the nominal interest rate is given by
ˆ Rt = σEt(ˆ ct+1 −ˆ ct), which states that under the optimal policy the nom-
inal and real interest rates coincide. Suppose that the central bank adopted
this expression as a policy feedback rule for the nominal interest rate. The
question is whether this proposed rule implements the Ramsey equilibrium
uniquely. The answer to this question is no. To see why, consider a solu-
tion of the form ˆ πt =  t, where  t is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and an
arbitrary standard deviation σ  ≥ 0. Notice that for all positive values of
σ , the proposed solution for inﬂation is different from the optimal one. It
is straightforward to see that the proposed solution satisﬁes the intertemporal
IS equation (12). The solution for consumption can be read off the NKPC as
being ˆ ct = γ/κˆ zt + (1/κ) t. We have, therefore, constructed a competitive
equilibriuminwhichanonfundamentalsourceofuncertainty,embodiedinthe
random variable  t, causes stochastic deviations of consumption and inﬂation
from their optimal paths. Notice that in this example there exists an inﬁnite
number of different equilibria indexed by the parameter, σ , governing the
volatility of the nonfundamental shock,  t.
One possible objection against the interest rate feedback rule proposed in
the previous paragraph is that it is cast in terms of the endogenous variable,
ct. In particular, one may wonder whether this endogeneity is responsible
for the inability of the proposed rule to implement the Ramsey equilibrium
uniquely. This concern is indeed unfounded. For, even if the interest rate
feedback rule were cast in terms of exogenous fundamental variables, the
failure of the strategy of using the Ramsey solution for Rt as an interest rate
feedback rule remains. Speciﬁcally, substituting the optimal rate of inﬂation,
ˆ πt = 0, into the New Keynesian Phillips curve (11) yields ˆ ct = γκ−1ˆ zt.
In turn, substituting this expression into the intertemporal IS curve (12) im-
plies that in the optimal equilibrium the nominal interest rate is given by
ˆ Rt =ˆ rn
t ≡ σγκ−1Et(ˆ zt+1−ˆ zt). The variable rn
t denotes the risk-free real (as
well as nominal) interest rate that prevails in the Ramsey optimal equilibrium
and is referred to as the natural rate of interest. Using this expression, equa-
tions (11)–(12) become a system of two linear stochastic difference equations
6 For detailed derivations of this expression, see, for instance, Woodford (2003). This linear
expression is the NKPC studied in the papers by Nason and Smith (2008) and Schorfheide (2008)
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in the endogenous variables ˆ πt and ˆ ct. This system possesses one eigen-
value inside the unit circle and one outside. It follows that the solution for
inﬂation and consumption is of the form ˆ πt+1 = ζππ ˆ πt + ζπzˆ zt +  t+1 and
ˆ ct = ζcπ ˆ πt+ζczˆ zt,where ˆ π0 isarbitrary, t isanonfundamentalshocksuchas
the one introduced above, and the parameter ζππ is less than unity in absolute
value. Clearly, the competitive equilibrium that the proposed rule implements
displays persistent and stochastic deviation from the optimal solution. We
conclude that the use of the Ramsey-optimal interest rate process as a policy
feedback rule fails to implement the desired competitive equilibrium.
Can the Taylor Rule Implement Optimal Policy?
ATaylor-typeruleisaninterestratefeedbackrulewherebythenominalinterest
rate is set as an increasing linear function of inﬂation and deviations of real
outputfromtrend,withaninﬂationcoefﬁcientgreaterthanunityandanoutput
coefﬁcient greater than zero. Formally, a Taylor-type interest rate rule can be
written as ˆ Rt = απ ˆ πt + αy ˆ yt, where απ > 1 and αy > 0 are parameters
and ˆ yt represents the percent deviation of real output from trend. Taylor’s
rule has been widely studied in monetary economics since the publication of
Taylor’s (1993) seminal article. It has been advocated as a desirable policy
speciﬁcation and is considered by some to be a reasonable approximation
of actual monetary policy in the United States and many other developed
countries. For this reason, we now consider the question of whether a Taylor
rule can implement the optimal allocation. The answer is that, in general, an
interest rate feedback rule of the type proposed by Taylor is unable to support
the Ramsey optimal equilibrium. This issue was ﬁrst analyzed by Woodford
(2001).
To establish whether the Taylor rule presented above can implement the
optimalallocation,wesettheinﬂationrateatitsoptimalvalueofzero(ˆ πt = 0)
and combine the intertemporal IS equation (12) with the Taylor rule. This
yields αy ˆ ct = σ(Et ˆ ct+1 −ˆ ct). Now, replacing ˆ ct with its optimal value of
γ/κˆ zt, we obtain Etˆ zt+1 = (1 + αy/σ)ˆ zt. This expression represents a con-
tradiction because the productivity shock, ˆ zt, is assumed to be an exogenous
stationary process with a law of motion independent of the policy parameter,
αy, and the preference parameter, σ. We have established that the proposed
Taylor rule fails to implement the optimal equilibrium. One can show that
this result also obtains when the nominal interest rate is assumed to respond
to deviations of output from its natural level, which is deﬁned as the level of
output associated with the optimal equilibrium and is given by yn
t ≡ γ/κˆ zt.
However,theoptimalallocationcanindeedbeimplementedbyamodiﬁed
Taylor rule of the form ˆ Rt =ˆ rn
t + απ ˆ πt as long as απ > 1. In this rule, ˆ rn
t
denotesthenaturalrateofinterestdeﬁnedearlier. Theﬁrstterminthemodiﬁed
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The second term makes it unique. The key difference between the standard
and modiﬁed Taylor rules is that the latter features a time-varying intercept
that allows the nominal interest rate to accommodate movements in the real
interest rate one-for-one without requiring changes in the price level. More
generally, the optimal competitive equilibrium can be implemented via rules
of the form ˆ Rt =ˆ rn
t + απ ˆ πt + αy(ˆ yt −ˆ yn
t ), with policy parameters απ and
αy satisfying the restrictions imposed by the deﬁnition of a Taylor-type rule
given above.
Applying this type of rule can be quite impractical, for it would require
knowledgeonthepartofthecentralbankofcurrentandexpectedfuturevalues
taken by all of the shocks that affect the real interest rate, as well as of the
function mapping such values to the natural rate of interest. This difﬁculty
raises the question of how close a less sophisticated interest rate rule would
get to implementing the optimal equilibrium. We turn to this issue next.
Optimal, Simple, and Implementable Rules
In this subsection, we analyze the ability of simple, implementable interest
rate rules to approximate the outcome of optimal policy. We draw from our
previous work (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe 2007a), where we evaluate policy in
the context of a calibrated model of the U.S. business cycle featuring monop-
olistic competition, sticky prices in product markets, capital accumulation,
government purchases ﬁnanced by lump-sum or distortionary taxes, and with
or without a transactional demand for money.7 In the model, business cycles
are driven by stochastic variations in the level of total factor productivity and
government consumption. We impose two requirements for an interest rate
ruletobeimplementable. First,therulemustdeliverauniquerationalexpecta-
tions equilibrium. Second, it must induce nonnegative equilibrium dynamics
for the nominal interest rate. For an interest rule to be simple, we require that
the interest rate be set as a function of a small number of easily observable
macroeconomic indicators. Speciﬁcally, we study interest rate feedback rules
thatrespondtomeasuresofinﬂation, output, andlaggedvaluesofthenominal
interest rate. The family of rules we consider is of the form
ln(Rt/R∗) = αR ln(Rt−1/R∗) + απEt ln(πt−i/π∗) + αyEt ln(yt−i/y∗);
i =− 1,0,1, (13)
where y∗ denotes the nonstochastic Ramsey steady-state level of aggregate
demand, and R∗, π∗, αR, απ, and αy are parameters. The index, i, can take
three values: 1, 0, and −1. When i = 1, we refer to the interest rate rule as
backward-looking, when i = 0 as contemporaneous, and when i =− 1a s
7 See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).456 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Evaluating Interest Rate Rules
απ αy αR Welfare Cost σπ σR
Ramsey Policy — — — 0.000 0.01 0.27
Optimized Rules
Contemporaneous (i =0 )
Smoothing 3 0.01 0.84 0.000 0.04 0.29
No Smoothing 3 0.00 — 0.001 0.14 0.42
Backward (i = 1) 3 0.03 1.71 0.001 0.10 0.23
Forward (i = −1) 3 0.07 1.58 0.003 0.19 0.27
Nonoptimized Rules
Taylor Rule (i = 0) 1.5 0.5 — 0.522 3.19 3.08
Simple Taylor Rule 1.5 — — 0.019 0.58 0.87
Inﬂation Targeting — — — 0.000 0.00 0.27
Notes: The interest rate rule is given by ln(Rt/R∗) = αR ln(Rt−1/R∗) +
απEt ln(πt−i/π∗) + αyEt ln(yt−i/y∗); i =− 1,0,1. In the optimized rules, the pol-
icy parameters απ,αy,and αR are restricted to lie in the interval [0,3]. The welfare
cost is deﬁned as the percentage decrease in the Ramsey-optimal consumption process
necessary to make the level of welfare under the Ramsey policy identical to that under
the evaluated policy. Thus, a positive ﬁgure indicates that welfare is higher under the
Ramsey policy than under the alternative policy. The standard deviation of inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate is measured in percent per year.
forward-looking. The optimal simple and implementable rule is the simple
and implementable rule that maximizes welfare of the representative agent.
Speciﬁcally, we characterize values of απ, αy, and αR that are associated with
the highest level of welfare of the representative agent within the family of
simple and implementable interest rate feedback rules deﬁned by equation
(13). As a point of comparison for policy evaluation, we also compute the real
allocation associated with the Ramsey optimal policy.
The ﬁrst row of Table 1 shows that under the Ramsey policy inﬂation is
virtually equal to zero at all times.8 The remaining rows of Table 1 report
policy evaluations. The welfare associated with each interest rate feedback
rule is compared to the level of welfare associated with the Ramsey-optimal
policy. Speciﬁcally, the welfare cost is deﬁned as the fraction, in percentage
points, of the consumption stream an agent living in the Ramsey economy
would be willing to give up to be as well off as in an economy in which
8 In the deterministic steady state of the Ramsey economy, the inﬂation rate is zero. One may
wonder why, in an economy featuring sticky prices as the single nominal friction, the volatility
of inﬂation is not exactly equal to zero at all times under the Ramsey policy. The reason is
that we do not follow the standard practice of subsidizing factor inputs to eliminate the distortion
introduced by monopolistic competition in product markets. Introducing such a subsidy would
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monetary policy takes the form of the respective interest rate feedback rule
shown in the table.
We consider seven different monetary policies: Four constrained-optimal
interest rate feedback rules and three nonoptimized rules. In the constrained-
optimal rule labeled no-smoothing, we search over the policy coefﬁcients, απ
andαy,keepingαR ﬁxedatzero. Thesecondconstrained-optimalrule,labeled
smoothing in the table, allows for interest rate inertia by setting optimally all




optimized rule is quite effective as it delivers welfare levels remarkably close
to those achieved under the Ramsey policy. At the same time, the rule induces
a stable rate of inﬂation, a feature that also characterizes the Ramsey policy.
Taking together this ﬁnding and those obtained in the previous subsection, we
conclude that although a Taylor rule cannot exactly implement the Ramsey
allocation, it delivers outcomes that are so close to the optimum in welfare
terms that, for practical purposes, it can be regarded as implementing the
Ramsey allocation.
We next study a case in which the central bank can smooth interest rates
over time. Our numerical search yields that the optimal policy coefﬁcients are
απ = 3, αy = 0.01, and αR = 0.84. The fact that the optimized rule features
substantial interest rate inertia means that the monetary authority reacts to
inﬂation much more aggressively in the long run than in the short run. The
ﬁnding that the interest rule is not superinertial (i.e., αR does not exceed
unity) means that the monetary authority is backward-looking. So, again, as
in the case without smoothing, optimal policy calls for a large response to
inﬂation deviations in order to stabilize the inﬂation rate and for no response
to deviations of output from the steady state. The welfare gain of allowing
for interest rate smoothing is insigniﬁcant. Taking the difference between the
welfare costs associated with the optimized rules with and without interest
rate smoothing reveals that agents would be willing to give up less than 0.001
percent of their consumption stream under the optimized rule with smoothing
to be as well off as under the optimized policy without smoothing.
The ﬁnding that allowing for optimal smoothing yields only negligible
welfare gains spurs us to investigate whether rules featuring suboptimal de-
grees of inertia or responsiveness to inﬂation can produce nonnegligible wel-
farelossesatall. PanelAofFigure3showsthat,providedthecentralbankdoes
not respond to output, αy = 0, varying απ and αR between 0 and 3 typically
leads to economically negligible welfare losses of less than 0.05 percent of
consumption. In the graph, crosses represent combinations of απ and αR that
are implementable and circles represent combinations that are implementable458 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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and that yield welfare costs less than 0.05 percent of consumption relative to
the Ramsey policy.
The blank area in the ﬁgure identiﬁes απ and αR combinations that are
not implementable either because the equilibrium fails to be locally unique
or because the implied volatility of interest rates is too high. This is the case
for values of απ and αR such that the policy stance is passive in the long run,
that is,
απ
1−αR < 1. For these parameter combinations the equilibrium is notS. Schmitt-Groh´ e and M. Uribe: Policy Implications of the NKPC 459
locally unique. This ﬁnding is a generalization of the result that, when the
inﬂation coefﬁcient is less than unity (απ < 1), the equilibrium is indetermi-
nate, which obtains in the absence of interest rate smoothing (αR = 0). We
also note that the result that passive interest rate rules render the equilibrium
indeterminate is typically derived in the context of models that abstract from
capitalaccumulation. Itis,therefore,reassuringthatthisparticularabstraction
appears to be of no consequence for the ﬁnding that (long run) passive policy
is inconsistent with local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium.




More importantly, PanelA of Figure 3 shows that virtually all parameter-
izations of the interest rate feedback rule that are implementable yield about
the same level of welfare as the Ramsey equilibrium. This ﬁnding suggests
a simple policy prescription, namely, that any policy parameter combination
that is irresponsive to output and active in the long run, is equally desirable
from a welfare point of view.
Onepossiblereactiontotheﬁndingthatimplementability-preservingvari-
ations in απ and αR have little welfare consequences may be that in the class
of models we consider, welfare is ﬂat in a large neighborhood around the
optimum parameter conﬁguration, so that it does not really matter what the
government does. This turns out not to be the case. Recall that in the wel-
fare calculations underlying Panel A of Figure 3, the response coefﬁcient on
output, αy, was kept constant and equal to zero. Indeed, interest rate rules
that lean against the wind by raising the nominal interest rate when output is
above trend can be associated with sizable welfare costs. Panel B of Figure 3
illustratestheconsequencesofintroducingacyclicalcomponenttotheinterest
rate rule. It shows that the welfare costs of varying αy can be large, thereby
underlining the importance of not responding to output. The ﬁgure shows the
welfare cost of deviating from the optimal output coefﬁcient (αy ≈ 0) while
keeping the inﬂation coefﬁcient of the interest rate rule at its optimal value
(απ = 3)andnotallowingforinterestratesmoothing(αR = 0). Welfarecosts
are monotonically increasing in αy. When αy = 0.7, the welfare cost is over
0.2 percent of the consumption stream associated with the Ramsey policy.
This is a signiﬁcant ﬁgure in the realm of policy evaluation at business-cycle
frequency.9 This ﬁnding suggests that bad policy can have signiﬁcant welfare
costsinourmodelandthatpolicymistakesarecommittedwhenpolicymakers
are unable to resist the temptation to respond to output ﬂuctuations.
9A similar result obtains if one allows for interest rate smoothing with αR taking its opti-
mized value of 0.84.460 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It follows that sound monetary policy calls for sticking to the basics of
responding to inﬂation alone.10 This point is conveyed with remarkable sim-
plicity by comparing the welfare consequences of a simple interest rate rule
that responds only to inﬂation with a coefﬁcient of 1.5 to those of a standard
Taylorrulethatrespondstoinﬂationaswellasoutputwithcoefﬁcients1.5and
0.5, respectively. Table 1 shows that the Taylor rule that responds to output
is signiﬁcantly welfare inferior to the simple interest rate rule that responds
solely to inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, the welfare cost of responding to output is
about half a percentage point of consumption.11
TheRamsey-optimalmonetarypolicyimpliesnearcompleteinﬂationsta-
bilization (see Table 1). It is reasonable to conjecture, therefore, that inﬂation
targeting,interpretedtobeanymonetarypolicycapableofbringingaboutzero
inﬂation at all times (πt = 1 for all t), would induce business cycles virtually
identical to those associated with the Ramsey policy. We conﬁrm this con-
jecture by computing the welfare cost associated with inﬂation targeting. The
welfarecostoftargetinginﬂationrelativetotheRamseypolicyisvirtuallynil.
An important issue in monetary policy is determining what measures of
inﬂation and aggregate activity the central bank should respond to. In par-
ticular, a question that has received considerable attention among academic
economists and policymakers is whether the monetary authority should re-
spond to past, current, or expected future values of output and inﬂation.
Here we address this question by computing optimal backward- and forward-
lookinginterestraterules. Thatis, inequation(13)weleti takethevalues−1
and+1. Table1showsthattherearenowelfaregainsfromtargetingexpected
future values of inﬂation and output as opposed to current or lagged values of
these macroeconomic indicators. Also, a muted response to output continues
to be optimal under backward- or forward-looking rules.
Under a forward-looking rule without smoothing (αR = 0), the rational
expectations equilibrium is indeterminate for all values of the inﬂation and
outputcoefﬁcientsintheinterval[0,3]. Thisresultisinlinewiththatobtained
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005). These authors consider an environment sim-
ilar to ours and characterize determinacy of equilibrium for interest rate rules
that depend only on the rate of inﬂation. Our results extend the ﬁndings of
Carlstrom and Fuerst to the case in which output enters in the feedback rule.
We close this section by noting that most of the results presented here,
extend to a model economy with a much richer battery of nominal and real
rigidities. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b), we consider an economy
featuring four real rigidities: habit formation, variable capacity utilization,
10 Other authors have also argued that countercyclical interest rate policy may be undesirable
(e.g., Ireland 1997 and Rotemberg and Woodford 1997).
11 The simple interest rate rule that responds solely to inﬂation is implementable, whereas
the standard Taylor rule is not, because it implies too high a volatility of nominal interest rates.S. Schmitt-Groh´ e and M. Uribe: Policy Implications of the NKPC 461
investment adjustment costs, and monopolistic competition in product and
labor markets. The economy in that study also includes four nominal fric-
tions, namely, sticky prices, sticky wages, money demand by households, and
money demand by ﬁrms. Finally, the model features a more realistic shock
structure that includes permanent stochastic variations in total factor produc-
tivity, permanent stochastic variations in the relative price of investment, and
stationary stochastic variations in government spending. The values assigned
to the structural parameters are based on existing econometric estimations of
the model. These studies, in turn, argue that the model explains satisfactorily
observed short-term ﬂuctuations in the postwar United States. We ﬁnd that
the Ramsey policy calls for stabilizing price inﬂation. More importantly, a
simple interest rate rule that responds only to inﬂation (with mute responses
to wage inﬂation or output) attains a level of welfare remarkably close to that
associated with the Ramsey optimal equilibrium.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article, we present a selective account of recent developments on the
policy implications of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The main lesson
derived from our analysis is that price stability emerges as a robust policy pre-
scription in models with product price rigidities. In fact, a minimum amount
of price stickiness sufﬁces to make inﬂation stabilization the overriding goal
of monetary policy.
The desirability of price stability obtains in several variations of the stan-
dard New Keynesian framework that include expanding the set of nominal
and real rigidities to allow for government spending ﬁnanced by distortionary
taxes, a transactional demand for money by households and ﬁrms, nominal
wage rigidity, habit formation, variable capacity utilization, and investment
adjustment costs.
A second important message that emerges is that a simple interest rate
feedback rule that responds aggressively only to a measure of consumer price
inﬂation delivers outcomes that are remarkably close to the Ramsey opti-
mal equilibrium. In particular, to emulate optimal monetary policy it is not
necessary that in setting the nominal rate the monetary authority respond to
deviations of output from trend or past values of the interest rate itself. In
this sense, the policy implications of the NKPC identiﬁed in this survey are
consistent with a pure inﬂation targeting objective.
We have left out a number of important issues in the theory of inﬂation
stabilization. For example, we limit attention to monetary policy under com-
mitment. There is an active literature exploring the policy implications of the
NKPC when the government is unable to commit to future actions. A central
themeinthisliteratureistoascertainwhetherlackofcommitmentgivesriseto
an optimal inﬂation bias. A second omission in the present analysis concerns462 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
models with asymmetric costs of price adjustment. Here again, the central
question is whether in the presence of downwardly rigid prices or wages, the
policymaker should pursue a positive inﬂation target. Finally, our article does
not discuss the recent literature on optimal monetary policy in models with
credit constraints. An important focus of this literature is whether this type of
frictionintroducesreasonsforthecentralbanktorespondtoﬁnancialvariables
in setting the short-term interest rate.
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